i don't know if any of you here get this but it's a great resource especially for those of us who work in the industry. to date i haven't been so lucky, but i know one person who avoided a particular mistake after reading about it in Callback.

here is an interesting excerpt:
“It Soon Got Very Dark and Quiet”

Shortly after landing, a B777 had to apply heavy braking to avoid overtaking a slower aircraft during taxi to the gate. After this conflict, the Boeing Captain stated to the First Officer that they should “probably shut one down” [to avoid repeated braking for the slower aircraft]. The First Officer’s report tells what happened next:

…I looked over and noticed he was guarding the left fuel control so I shut the right engine down. To our dismay, it soon got very dark and quiet and we realized we had both shut an engine down. The Captain braked the aircraft to a stop. I cranked the APU, remained seated, notified Tower we would be holding for a few minutes and waited forever for the minute to pass and enjoy the resumption of electrical power. I then started both engines. We resumed taxi to the gate. The outcome was a 4-minute delay in taxiing to the gate at the end of an otherwise very normal flight. No doubt stressful for the crew and passengers. From a human factors point of view…I feel that fatigue and jet lag played an important role on this evening…flipping one’s body clock by 12 hours in a 24-hour period has its challenges. It is still a 2-pilot operation in the dark on the backside of the body clock….

The Captain’s report of this same incident added that there was “too much verbalization” in the cockpit and “not enough commands.”
you can find the latest issue here: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publication...ack/cb_346.htm
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